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While cloud computing is an attractive option in
terms of price, availability, and scalability, cloud con-
sumers must also weigh the security concerns of a cloud
environment. In particular, security breaches due to mis-
configuration are common, and this prevalence starts
with inadequate education and training. Consequently,
we incorporated a capture the flag (CTF) activity into
an existing course to illuminate the potential pitfalls and
consequences of cloud misconfiguration and to encour-
age participants to protect against such issues in their
own applications. In this paper, we report on the effec-
tiveness of the CTF activity to achieve these goals. Our
evaluation specifically focuses on participants’ interests,
self-perceptions, and application of essential security
practices (e.g., defensive programming techniques) to
defend against common types of attacks. Our results
indicate that the CTF activity was perceived favorably
by students, but participants performed comparably to
their peers on independent assessments, including test
questions related to web security and securing a web
application developed as part of a course project. We ex-
amine these issues and suggest a path forward to address
them, particularly by better aligning the CTF activity
with the stated course outcomes in conjunction with col-
lecting additional data in future semesters.
1. Introduction
Although cloud service providers offer security con-
figuration options like firewalls, secure keys, and identity
and access management (IAM) controls, companies rou-
tinely misconfigure all of these, to great detriment. In
July 2019, Capital One revealed that a hacker had dis-
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covered a misconfigured Amazon Web Services (AWS)
firewall and had exploited it for months, compromising
tens of thousands of bank account numbers, over 100
thousand social security numbers, and 100 million credit
card applications [1]. In October 2019, the security ven-
dor Imperva said that hackers stole an administrative
AWS private key that was exposed due to a misconfigu-
ration, which the attackers then used to lift and access a
database snapshot of user records from 2017 and prior [2].
In November 2019, researchers with the security net-
working blog vpnMentor revealed that the business short
message service (SMS) solutions provider TrueDialog
had exposed 604 GB of data, including tens of millions
of text messages and other private information, on an
unsecured Microsoft Azure database [3]. These exam-
ples show that cloud misconfigurations can result in data
breaches, exposure of private customer data, and innu-
merable amounts of time and money spent to rectify the
issues and ameliorate the damage [4, 5].
With such high consequences, why do cloud secu-
rity misconfigurations persist? Obviously this question
is multi-facted, but we hypothesize that a contributing
factor is a lack of educational resources, particularly in
software engineering curricula. Despite the increasing
ubiquity of cloud computing in industry, many computer
science programs lack courses that address this field of
computing. Undergraduate curriculum guidelines rele-
gate web security and cloud computing to electives with
superficial learning outcomes, requiring only “a basic
awareness of a concept as opposed to expecting real
facility with its application” [6]. Furthermore, introduc-
tory cloud computing resources fail to provide sufficient
urgency and depth for students to understand common
cloud configuration pitfalls and to appreciate their dan-
gers. Even graduate-level courses often cover security
topics like IAM in the most cursory manner, in some
cases deferring the topic to the end of the course and
instructing students to use administrative accounts in





the interim, which violates cloud security best practices.
Regrettably, it seems that current pedagogy favors the
immediate gratification of building and deploying appli-
cations over their security.
Security and secure practices should not be an af-
terthought, however, but a top priority. Consequently,
we incorporated a capture the flag (CTF) activity [7] for
students in an existing undergraduate course to learn the
stakes and dangers of cloud misconfiguration in a hands-
on environment. The CTF activity uses a cloud environ-
ment to host a vulnerable AWS-based web application
that comprises a polling interface and an election results
tabulator. The application includes built-in vulnerabili-
ties based on the Open Web Application Security Project
(OWASP) Top 10 web application security risks [8] and
on common misconfigurations in cloud environments [9].
Participants must change “election” data and are scored
on their understanding of vulnerabilities and on the de-
gree to which they compromise the application. Because
the CTF activity targets introductory-level cybersecu-
rity students or software developers with limited security
expertise, it requires just a basic understanding of the
relationship between a client, server, and cloud provider.
Moreover, students (or software developers) with no web
development or cloud computing experience can com-
plete the CTF activity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we summarize the shortcomings of exist-
ing educational resources related to cloud security and
also describe prior work related to CTF activities. In
Section 3, we describe the CTF activity that we used.
Section 4 evaluates the effectiveness of the CTF activ-
ity, particularly focusing on participants’ self-perceptions
of their learning and participants’ performance on inde-
pendent assessments. Finally, Section 5 concludes and
highlights avenues for future work.
2. Related Work
From a pedogogical perspective, existing educational
resources do not sufficiently emphasize the importance
of secure configuration in introductory cloud comput-
ing resources. For example, the “AWS Fundamentals”
course offered by Coursera defers cloud security to its
last modules. The “Introduction to Cloud Computing”
course offered by Udemy does not cover cloud security,
and the “Beginner’s Guide” to cloud computing offered
by Microsoft Azure makes only a cursory reference to se-
curity. More advanced courses, such as Udemy’s “AWS
Certified Developer” course, cover IAM at an introduc-
tory and advanced level, but only through video lectures
and a quiz. We have not found any introductory-level
cloud computing courses that contain a hands-on activity
like a CTF exercise to help students learn the details and
importance of securely configuring a cloud environment.
Even more-established topics like web security suf-
fer from similar shortfalls. Connolly [10] reports that
web textbooks do not contain substantial coverage of
web security, and Taylor and Sakharka [11] found that
the majority of textbooks used in database courses fail
to address Structured Query Language (SQL) injection,
the top web application security risk [8]. More broadly,
textbooks for computer systems courses regularly use
unsafe functions [12]. A recent review by Švábenský et
al. [13] indicated that only a small subset of papers at
the Special Interest Group on Computer Science Educa-
tion (SIGCSE) Technical Symposium and Innovation and
Technology in Computer Science Education (ITiCSE)
conference pertain to cybersecurity education, but the
majority of those include a hands-on learning activity.
For example, Basit et al. [14] describe a platform to teach
SQL injection that comprises 12 challenges where partic-
ipants exploit a vulnerable web application. Our work is
unique due to its focus on the currently niche intersection
of cloud computing and cybersecurity, which have not
been addressed in recent years at venues like the SIGCSE
Technical Symposium even when there are papers about
these topics in isolation.
The OWASP Vulnerable Web Applications Direc-
tory1 provides a comprehensive registry of applications
that might be used as the basis for a CTF activity. For
example, Juice Shop is an insecure JavaScript application
designed for security training and CTFs, and WebGoat is
an interactive environment to teach web application secu-
rity using an insecure Java application. Hack The Box2
and TryHackMe3 are online tools that provide hands-on
cybersecurity training. Kjorveziroski et al. [15] survey a
number of these platforms and tools. In general, using an
existing vulnerable application has many benefits com-
pared to creating one from scratch (such as the election
application that we use) but has an inherent disadvantage
in that solutions are often available online. In addition,
vulnerable applications often support multiple challenges
(e.g., Juice Shop has nearly a dozen focused on injec-
tion), which may be overwhelming to students, requires
considerable customization to integrate effectively with
existing course material, and may not support tracking
individual students’ completion of activities (which is
essential when awarding credit as part of a course).
CTF activities are an increasingly popular way to in-
troduce cybersecurity skills to non-experts (e.g., [16]).






Table 1. Overview of vulnerabilities required to compromise the CTF election app
# Task OWASP Top 10 Risk(s)
1 Retrieve a list of all users from the ”Forgot Username” page Injection
2 Log in with the “user” account Broken Authentication
3 Access the “admin” account Broken Access Control
4 Retrieve “dev” login credentials Security Misconfiguration, Sensitive Data Exposure
5 Log in with dev credentials to cast “mail in” ballots Insufficient Logging & Monitoring
ence (e.g., [17, 18]), which may be more motivating to
students than traditional methods of learning [19]. Gami-
fication, in general, seems to be an effective way to en-
gage students [20], although there are some pitfalls [21].
While there are other CTF activities available, many are
targeted at a very specific subset of people, namely, those
with years of hacking or cybersecurity experience. This
narrow focus creates a substantial barrier to entry and
leads to fewer people participating. Similar to NERD
DOGMA [16], our work fills an existing gap by using an
introductory-level exercise.
3. Election CTF
Cloud service providers like Amazon offer their re-
sources to governments for voter registration and vote
tabulation [22]. Voter privacy in a cloud environment
heightens security concerns because secret ballots are
crucial to ensuring fair elections in a democracy. Addi-
tionally, voter registration information is often compre-
hensive enough to be abused by a malicious actor for
phishing or identity theft [23]. A majority of Americans
already mistrust the integrity of U.S. elections, and mis-
configured or insecure election-related cloud resources
could damage that faith even further [24]. Nevertheless,
a cloud-based election is vulnerable to the same attacks
that have recently affected large companies, as mentioned
previously, and a security exploit in a cloud environment
may have even greater consequences when applied to an
election.
Given these issues, we believe that a cloud-based elec-
tion application provides a realistic scenario for our CTF
activity, particularly in light of the COVID-19 pandemic,
which complicated traditional in-person voting. We use
AWS to host an election application that is designed to
have exploitable vulnerabilities. While various cloud ser-
vice providers offer services for elections, we focus on
AWS because of it is one of the largest cloud providers.
Our CTF activity has two parts: the first focuses on
theory, and the second focuses on practice. We score par-
ticipants based on the number of correct answers to ten
questions, five of which are theoretical and five of which
are practical. Due to limitations of our course’s learning
management system (LMS) and in keeping with the CTF
design as an introductory-level exercise, we provide ex-
plicit instructions and hints to guide participants through
the process of compromising the vulnerable election ap-
plication. Our step-by-step instructions are designed
to lower the barrier to entry, encouraging participation
among those who are unfamiliar with CTF activities or
less confident in their ability.
The theory portion has five multiple choice questions
related to the OWASP Top 10 web application security
risks [8] and common cloud misconfigurations [9]. These
questions require participants to identify a particular type
of vulnerability based on its description. Each serves as
an implicit hint for later practical application in a real-
world scenario.
The practical application portion requires compro-
mising the vulnerable election application to sway the
election in favor of a political party of the participant’s
choice. A link to the vulnerable application is provided
when participants start the CTF activity along with an
architectural diagram of the application (Figure 1). There
are five major security vulnerabilities in the website that
participants must exploit to accomplish this goal (see
Table 1). A linear path through the vulnerabilities and ex-
ploits is easiest, but participants may be able to progress
in another order (e.g., identifying a vulnerable user ac-
count is easier after enumerating all the accounts, but
a fortuitous guess is also sufficient). Each exploit re-
veals a “flag” that proves the participant has successfully
completed an attack. For example, using an SQL injec-
tion to retrieve a list of all the registered users allows
the participant to identify the username of a particular
Figure 1. Architecture of the election application
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Table 2. Students’ academic majors
Major # %
Computer Science 31 81.6
Cybersecurity 12 31.6
Operations Research 3 7.9
user. Participants submit each flag as the answer to a
fill-in-the-blank question.
4. Evaluation
We offered for students to complete the CTF activity
for extra credit in Comp Sci 364: Databases and Applica-
tions at the United States Air Force Academy in spring
2021. This course touches on cloud computing and also
covers web development, including how to secure web ap-
plications against common attacks such as SQL injection
and cross-site scripting (XSS). Most students enrolled in
the course are computer science majors, but a handful ma-
jor in related disciplines (e.g., cybersecurity and systems
engineering are common historically). Of the 38 students
enrolled in the course, 35 were juniors and 3 were seniors.
Table 2 summarizes the majors of the students (the per-
centages sum to more than 100.0% due to double majors).
In the prior course offering, students struggled to apply
web security concepts in the context of a project. That is,
many project teams failed to secure the web application
that they developed against common attacks, specifically
SQL injection and XSS. Thus, a CTF activity that il-
lustrates the risks of missing or incorrectly configured
security controls not only reinforces the material covered
in the course but also may improve students’ application
of essential security practices. Furthermore, we hoped
that the authentic learning experience offered by a CTF
exercise would increase interest among underrepresented
groups in computer science and cybersecurity.
To minimize the potential for coercion, students were
offered two options for extra credit: either our CTF ac-
tivity or writing a detailed description of three OWASP
Top 10 web application security risks. Both options
cover essentially the same concepts albeit using different
formats—a CTF game vs. a written synopsis of attacks
and how to defend against them. Each activity was esti-
mated to require 1–2 hours total and was worth the same
amount of extra credit. Students would only receive extra
credit for one of the aforementioned options (i.e., they
could not complete both for double the extra credit).
The primary evaluation metric for our CTF activity
is participants’ learning—i.e., participants should have a
better understanding of real-world cloud and web security
issues than when they started. More specifically, we
sought to answer the following research questions:
1. Does the CTF activity affect participants’ self-
perception of their ability to secure or compromise
a web application?
2. Does completing the CTF activity improve partici-
pants’ performance on independent assessments?
3. Are there differences in students’ perceptions of
the value of the two extra credit activities?
4. Are there differences in students’ enjoyment of the
two extra credit activities?
5. Does the likelihood that students would recom-
mend the activity to others differ between the two
extra credit activities?
We used SciPy [25] for our statistical analyses with
the exception of the permutation test, which used MLx-
tend [26].
The remainder of this section details our results. We
start with students’ self-perceptions from an initial sur-
vey and interest in completing an optional assignment
for extra credit (e.g., our CTF activity). Next, we ad-
dress students’ understanding and application of cloud-
related cybersecurity vulnerabilities as measured by self-
perception and independent assessments in the course.
We also examine participants’ feedback after complet-
ing the extra credit activities. Finally, we conclude this
section by summarizing threats to validity.
4.1. Initial Survey Results
As part of normal class activities, all students were
given time to complete a short survey that focused on
their confidence in developing, securing, and exploiting
web applications and that inquired about their interests
in completing optional assignments for extra credit. This
feedback provided data regarding how student character-
istics, such as familiarity with certain aspects of cyber-
security, might influence their interest in completing an
optional assignment for extra credit, including our CTF
activity. The response rate for this survey was 65.8% (25
/ 38 students).
Responses to students’ perception of their understand-
ing of web technologies were positive overall. Students
were far less comfortable, though, with securing and
exploiting web applications. Table 3 summarizes the
students’ responses to various statements posed with a
5-point Likert scale [27] (strongly disagree, disagree,
neutral, agree, strongly agree). The coverage of these
topics in the course probably explains the differences. In
particular, the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) is
used repeatedly throughout the web programming block
with defensive programming techniques (e.g., input vali-
dation) introduced alongside client- and server-side pro-
gramming. Attacks (e.g., SQL injection and XSS) are
covered in a single lesson that illustrates attacks primarily
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Table 3. Students’ self-perceptions of their understanding of web technologies and their ability to secure or
compromise a web application using a 5-point Likert scale
Question Responses
I can read and interpret (i.e., understand the syntax and meaning
of) the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML). .
619
I can read and interpret (i.e., understand the syntax and meaning
of) Cascading Style Sheets (CSS).
6181
I can read and interpret (i.e., understand the syntax and meaning
of) JavaScript.
1861
I can read and interpret (i.e., understand the syntax and meaning
of) queries written using the Structured Query Language (SQL).
4174
I can use an SQL injection vulnerability to compromise a web
application.
121111
I recognize the importance of defending web applications using
defensive programming.
6172
I know how to defend web applications using defensive pro-
gramming.
161161
I can use a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability to compro-
mise a web application.























Figure 2. Students’ interest in extra credit activities
as motivation for defending against them and reiterates
the use of defensive programming techniques (e.g., pre-
pared statements and properly handling untrusted user
data) that were introduced previously.
Students’ interest in potential extra credit activities
was positive (Figure 2). 60% of students who completed
the survey indicated interest in the CTF activity, and an
additional 32% indicated that they might be interested.
In contrast, the alternative OWASP activity garnered half
as many positive responses (“Yes” in Figure 2), and 20%
of respondents indicated that they were not interested in
the OWASP activity (see Figure 3).
4.2. Students’ Learning
We hypothesized that students who completed the
CTF activity would improve their understanding and ap-
plication of techniques to secure web applications com-
pared to students who did not complete the CTF activity.







































Figure 3. Potential reasons for not completing extra
credit activities
two strategies: 1) a feedback survey after completion
of either extra credit activity and 2) targeted questions
on tests and the security of a web application developed
as part of a course project. The feedback survey had
nine questions (one open-ended and eight Likert-scale)
in common; two additional open-ended questions were
included for participants who completed the CTF activity
to provide feedback on their approach and any portions
of the activity that they found frustrating. After the con-
clusion of the semester, we compared the performance of
those completing the CTF activity to other students who
did not complete it. Obviously students’ self-perceptions
are less reliable than other forms of course assessment,
yet we were particularly interested in students’ impres-
sion of the effectiveness of a hands-on CTF activity.
Table 4 summarizes the participation in the extra
credit activities. The percentage identifies the propor-
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Table 4. Summary of participation in extra credit
activities
Participants Scores
Activity # % µ σ
CTF 16 42.1 9.125 1.455
OWASP 7 18.4 9.906 0.249
tion of students in the course who completed each activ-
ity, and the score for both activities is out of 10 points.
More than 60% of students completed either the CTF or
OWASP activity. We were surprised by the number who
chose to complete the OWASP activity, as we expected
the writing requirement not to appeal to many students.
Scores on the CTF activity were slightly lower on aver-
age because students did not receive credit if they were
unable to complete an exploit. As one student wrote in
the feedback survey, “i [sic] didn’t quite know the syntax
of the attack even though i [sic] knew the general idea
of what was needed.” Regardless, every student’s final
score in the course improved as a result of completing
the extra credit activity.
4.2.1. Self-Perceptions Table 5 summarizes the CTF
participants’ self-perceptions of their ability to secure
a web application and to exploit a vulnerable one. We
tested the null hypothesis that the two distributions (i.e.,
before and after completing the CTF activity) are equal
using a permutation test of the means (Pr(exact)) and the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test [28] (p < 0.05). Although
all participants indicated that they understood the im-
portance of defending web applications using defensive
programming techniques, the CTF activity underscored
that point. Of particular interest are the last two ques-
tions that address SQL injection and XSS attacks, both
of which are covered in the course. Both statistical tests
indicate that the differences are significant (p < 0.05);
therefore, we reject our null hypothesis and conclude
that participants’ self-assessments of their understand-
ing and application of web security increased. The CTF
participants reported much greater confidence in their
ability to conduct both types of attacks after complet-
ing the activity. Interestingly, the CTF activity does not
directly address XSS attacks, which suggests that partic-
ipants’ self-perceptions may be positively biased—i.e.,
having successfully completed an SQL injection attack



























































































Figure 5. Teams’ performance on security
component of a project
4.2.2. Independent Assessments Regrettably, stu-
dents’ performance on test questions related to web secu-
rity do not paint as rosy a picture as their self-perceptions.
Figure 4 summarizes questions related to identifying the
type of vulnerability in pseudocode, inputs that exploit an
SQL injection vulnerability, and defensive programming
techniques to mitigate potential vulnerabilities. Students
who completed the CTF activity performed comparably
to students who did not complete either extra credit ac-
tivity in most cases. Mitigating potential vulnerabilities
using defensive programming techniques is a possible
exception to this trend, which is interesting given that the
CTF activity focuses on exploiting a cloud application
rather than defending it.
Unfortunately, identifying appropriate mitigations on
test questions did not result in the application of these
techniques in the context of a project. Teams who had
at least one member complete the CTF activity gener-
ally performed worse than teams whose members did
not complete either extra credit activity! As we explored
this puzzling outcome, we realized that three teams with
CTF participants performed markedly worse than others.
Consequently, Figure 5 shows the project performance of
teams grouped by the percentage of team members who
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Table 5. Comparison of students’ self-assessments of their understanding and application of techniques to
secure web applications before (pre) and after (post) completing the CTF activity using a 5-point Likert scale
Pr(exact) Wilcoxon
Question Responses p W p
I recognize the importance of de-









I know how to defend web appli-








1 0.022 0.500 0.013
I can use an SQL injection vul-









I can use a cross-site scripting
(XSS) vulnerability to compro-
mise a web application.








Table 6. Comparison of students’ impressions of the extra credit activities using a 5-point Likert scale
Mann–Whitney Kruskal–Wallis
Question Responses H p U p








59.000 0.032 4.820 0.028








57.000 0.076 3.321 0.068








66.500 0.004 8.478 0.004
I would recommend this
activity to others.







64.000 0.007 7.657 0.006
completed the CTF activity. Although the performance
of teams whose members all completed the CTF activity
remains lower than those whose members did not, these
two groups’ performance is roughly comparable. This
result is obviously disappointing, as it suggests that com-
pleting the CTF activity by itself does not always trans-
late into students’ use of secure programming techniques
(e.g., exhaustive input validation and context-sensitive
encoding).
4.3. Participants’ Feedback
After completing either extra credit activity, partici-
pants answered several questions about the activity itself
and what they learned. Our null hypothesis is that the
CTF and OWASP activities are perceived equally by
participants using the Mann-Whitney U test [29] and
Kruskal–Wallis H test [30] (p < 0.05). Table 6 summa-
rizes the results. All participants agreed that the extra
credit activities were valuable, but CTF participants were
more likely to strongly agree with that statement, and we
Page 1058
reject the null hypothesis that the activities are perceived
to be equally valuable (p < 0.05). While the CTF ac-
tivity appears to challenge its participants more than the
alternative OWASP activity, with a p-value above 0.05
we fail to reject the null hypothesis. The vast majority
of CTF participants (≈ 90%) strongly agreed that the
activity was both enjoyable and would recommend it to
others. The differences in participants’ enjoyment of
the activity and likelihood of recommending it to others
were significant (p < 0.05) so we reject the null hypoth-
esis. In fact, our results might characterize the OWASP
activity as mundane: reading and summarizing descrip-
tions of OWASP Top 10 web application security risks
is a straightforward task, and students who invested the
requisite time had little difficulty (see Table 4).
When asked about what they learned from the CTF ac-
tivity, most participants reported variations on a common
theme. As summarized by one student, “I learned how
easy it is to compromise a website that has not been prop-
erly secured.” Others transferred this offensive perspec-
tive to defensive applications. For example, “I learned
the importance of strong passwords, preventing privilege
escalation, and validating input.” Another admitted, “I
didn’t necessarily learn how to prevent exploitation, but
i [sic] know what some exploits look like, like if my
inputs aren’t validated that’s a threat. . . .” Given that the
course focused on building (and securing) web applica-
tions rather than exploiting them, the CTF activity is not
perfectly aligned with the existing course material. Par-
ticipants’ independently-assessed performance (see Fig-
ures 4 and 5) reinforces this conclusion. Consequently,
it might be beneficial to augment the CTF activity by
including questions (or tasks) focused on mitigating the
various vulnerabilities. For example, participants might
be required to modify the “Forgot Username” page so
that the SQL query uses a prepared statement and receive
another “flag” when their modified application passes an
automated test from a security scanner.
4.4. Threats to Validity
The relatively small number of participants poses a
significant challenge to our analysis. The CTF activity
was offered as extra credit toward the end of the semester,
a semester that was already particularly challenging due
to the impact of COVID-19. While exciting that more
than 40% of students chose to complete the CTF activity,
the alternative OWASP activity was more popular than
expected (almost 20% of students chose to complete
it). With only 38 students enrolled in the course, the
small sample sizes complicate some analysis, such as
comparing students’ self-perceptions before and after the
activity, because both surveys were optional and only
50% of the CTF participants completed both surveys.
We believe that there may be other confounding fac-
tors that account for the apparent lack of improvement
on independent assessments for students who completed
the CTF activity. For example, we measured students’
understanding of techniques to secure web applications
primarily through multiple choice questions on exams
and the application of such techniques in the context of
a course project. Unfortunately, both measures were es-
sentially binary in practice. Most teams failed to defend
against at least one type of attack (most commonly, XSS
attacks, which were not addressed by the CTF activity),
which resulted in earning only 50% credit on the security
component of the final project rubric. In many cases,
teams also failed to implement essential functionality for
their web application, which indirectly improved their
score for the security component (a static website is vul-
nerable to neither SQL injection nor XSS). The negative
correlation between functionality and security is partic-
ularly problematic: although we excluded teams whose
applications had multiple major functionality issues (e.g.,
not providing a form to update database entities), no
team included in our analysis earned full credit for the
functionality of their web application.
5. Conclusion
Our goal was to incorporate an active learning activity
to introduce students to the potential vulnerabilities in-
herent in cloud and web applications and to evaluate the
effectiveness of this activity from multiple perspectives,
including students’ self-perceptions of their mastery of
web security, test questions, and practical application
in the context of the development of a web application.
Most students were interested in completing the CTF
activity for extra credit. Participants reported that they
found the activity valuable and enjoyable. Moreover,
90% indicated that they would recommend the activity to
others. Unfortunately, completing our CTF activity had
little impact on participants’ performance on indepen-
dent assessments, which is disappointing but possibly an
artifact of reusing existing course activities (i.e., tests and
projects) that addressed the CTF competencies only tan-
gentially. These mixed results suggest that a CTF activity
may be a valuable active learning activity—it is certainly
more preferable to students than some alternatives—but
it did not improve students’ learning outcomes to the
degree we hoped.
Future Work
We intend to use the CTF activity in future semesters
to increase our sample size and to validate our results.
Further analysis is also required to understand the degree
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to which students’ backgrounds impact our results (e.g.,
cybersecurity students may perform better in general on
independent assessments related to web security). Be-
cause the CTF activity did not fully align with the stated
learning outcomes in the course, we should increase the
number of test questions and weight placed on security
for the project to provide a better picture of areas where
the CTF activity is beneficial.
It is well-known that the STEM disciplines in general
and computing fields in particular suffer from limited
diversity [31, 32]. It is unreasonable to expect a single
pedagogical approach (lecture, lab, assignment, etc.) to
cater equally well to a diverse set of individuals [33].
Prior work suggests that certain groups (e.g., women)
are more interested when activities are perceived relevant
to their personal interests or societal concerns [34, 35].
Consequently, we want to investigate the relationships
among the following variables:
• students’ self-perceptions of their understanding
and application of techniques to secure web appli-
cations,
• interest in completing activities for extra credit,
• score on an extra credit activity,
• self-perception of an extra credit activity,
• performance on independent assessments, and
• demographic data (gender, race, and major).
The effectiveness of the CTF activity for traditionally
underrepresented groups in computer science and cyber-
security is of particular interest, and we look forward
to completing this analysis when we have a sufficient
number of participants to avoid the identification of indi-
viduals using demographic data.
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A. Legal Issues
The AWS terms of service explicitly allow for the
type of penetration testing that participants in our CTF
activity perform.4 Specifically, AWS permits penetration
testing against AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) in-
stances and AWS Elastic Beanstalk environments, which
are the resources we use and ask participants to exploit.
CTF participants do not access any AWS administra-
tion screens, nor are they able to obtain root access to
a victim virtual machine (VM). At the very worst, the
participants might be able to corrupt the election database
and make the application unusable. Fortunately, if this
were to happen, the CTF administrator must only restart
the application, and it will restore the database to its de-
fault state. Thus, the CTF activity falls well within the
boundaries of what AWS allows in their service-level
agreement (SLA).
4Penetration Testing: https://aws.amazon.com/security/penetration-
testing
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